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Island Entrepreneurs: Insights from Exceptionally Successful Knowledge-Driven SMEs 
from 5 European Island Territories 
 
 
Abstract: Developing successful, indigenously-owned, small scale, export-oriented, 
manufacturing firms from small island locations is difficult but not impossible. This paper 
describes key outcomes of a research project which is reviewing a selection of such 
successful firms from 5 European island territories. Operating in the information and 
communication technology sector allows small island firms to compete successfully in 
export markets. They often do so by depending on the wide, ‘extra-island’ contacts and 
experiences of their ‘global-local’ entrepreneurial founder-owners, who often leverage 
start-up funds from private and personal sources. The absence of notable local market 
opportunities induces island entrepreneurs to ‘export or perish’, obliging a competitive 




There is general agreement that small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) 
contribute vigorously to economic growth and to the creation of sustainable employment, a 
contribution all the more readily evident in the context of massive lay-offs from large firms 
and especially appreciated in epochs of long term structural unemployment. It is commonly 
understood that SMEs have a general capacity for flexibility and innovation, enabling them 
to respond more quickly to structural changes and to adapt just as rapidly to changing 
consumer taste and demand. SMEs play an even more pronounced role in the case of small 
island territories, since the typical average enterprise size is even smaller than elsewhere 
(Granovetter, 1984).  
 
This paper will first outline the extensive structural handicaps generally affecting the 
set-up and operation of SMEs in small island territories. It will next discuss the research 
methodology of, and basic data collection from, a pilot project-in-progress which seeks to 
showcase the exceptional success of a clutch of SMEs from 5 small island territories located 
on the European periphery. A discussion of the characteristics of these SMEs follows, 
focusing in particular on a group of ‘hi-tech’, knowledge driven firms. The ensuing 




Small size and geographical isolation are often viewed as sources of economic 
vulnerability which might adversely affect economic growth and firm performance (Bertram, 
2004: 344). The challenges claimed to be faced by local small firms based in such small 
island territories are, to say the least, daunting: 
 
• The size of the domestic market is small and, in the case of archipelagos, also fragmented 
and dispersed; 
• There are high transport costs, especially handling, freight and insurance expenses, partly 
because of a tendency towards oligopoly and imperfect competition; 
• There is an inability to achieve and exploit economies of scale in the local market: as a 
result, costs such as health, housing, energy and education tend to be higher per capita; 
• There are often very limited linkages to the local, small economy, which may tend to be 
significantly dependent on, and biased towards, the production of a single crop, product or 
service; 
• There may be a lack of skilled labour power or expertise which, where available, tends to 
relocate to larger and better paying urban agglomerations; 
• There may be a lack of local business knowhow or acumen which, where available, is likely 
to move away in search of better returns on investment and larger markets; 
• There may be a dearth of effective and competitive support and infrastructural services, such 
as telecommunications and venture capital. 
 
Sources: Armstrong et al. (1993); Briguglio (1995); Dolman (1985); Doumenge (1985: 86); 
Encontre (1999);  Fischer & Encontre (1998) and Payne (1987). 
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This is not to say that islands have no advantages to offer as competitive 
manufacturing platforms: Greenwood & McCarthy (2000: 179) cite lower occupancy costs, a 
more stable labour force and reduced labour costs; while Easterly & Kraay (2000) claim that 
the alleged problems of small island economies can be addressed through suitable policy 
measures. Still, the economic challenges facing islands are so widely recognised that a 
number of international or regional organisations – including the United Nations1, the 
European Union2 and the Commonwealth Secretariat3 - remain today in general agreement 
that small territories, especially small island regions, share a set of characteristics which 
poses specific development problems. Such characteristics are fairly similar to those borne 
by peripheral rural areas which lose out from agglomeration economics and demographics 
(Polèse & Shearmur, 2002) or by remote rural, land-locked or mountainous regions (Read, 
2005; Srinivasan, 1986).  
 
Island Disadvantages 
John Donne’s oft-quoted dictum: ‘no man [sic] is an island, but a piece of the 
continent, a part of the main’ (Donne, 1624) suggests that islands are isolated and 
disconnected locations, and therefore not only on the fringe of goings on, but also ill-
equipped to be competitive because of defensive self-absorption. Indeed, the difficulties 
associated with the development of successful, indigenously-owned, small scale, 
manufacturing enterprises from small island locations has been highlighted in case 
                                          
1 Mainly via its Small Island Developing States (SIDS) programme. View declaration following the January 2005 
Mauritius Conference at: http://www.un.org/smallislands2005/pdf/sids_strategy.pdf  
2 The European Union recognizes that ‘island regions’ – along with rural, mountainous, cross-border or low-
population density areas  - suffer from structural handicaps linked to their island status; and has spelt these out to 
include “remoteness, insularity, small size, difficult topography and climate, and economic dependence on a few 
products”. These handicaps are imputed to be permanent and therefore chronic inhibitors towards social and 
economic development. See Declaration 30 adopted by the Conference which adopted the Treaty of Amsterdam 
(1999) and, since June 18th 2004, also enshrined in the Treaty establishing the EU Constitution (Article III-116). 
3 The economic vulnerability of small (often island) states has been championed by the Commonwealth 
Secretariat since 1985. Key publications include: Atkins et al. (2000); Briguglio & Kisanga (2005); Charles 
(1997) and Wignaraja et al. (2004). 
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study research (Baldacchino, 1999, 2002). Local business-persons often peddle low-
risk mercantilism (meaning wholesale and retail trade with low local productive value 
added) or otherwise engage in service activities which do not suffer from scale 
economies (Baldacchino, 1995, 1998). Michael Porter (1998: 171) has gone as far as to 
refer to an industry cluster which becomes gripped by complacency and an inward 
focus as insular, probably on the assumption that islands are “closed and inward-
looking systems” (ibid.).  A knowledge economy context continues to raise the stakes. 
Within the parameters of the global knowledge economy, as the world heads inexorably 
towards becoming a network of prosperous city-regions (Ohmae, 2001: 33), there is 
even less scope for places or firms to try and survive as ‘islands’ of productive 
industrial activity. It therefore comes as no surprise that research on island 
entrepreneurs is often heavily laced with pessimism (e.g.: Fairbairn, 1988; Saffu, 
2003). Finding a product with ‘cutting edge’ technology intended mainly for export that 
is developed by a small island-based business in a small-scale operation can only be 
described as exceptional.  
 
The NISSOS Project 
The NISSOS Project4 is searching for such exceptionalities and looking at the 
transferability of their economic story via vocational education and training. NISSOS is 
a 3-year pilot project, conceived and designed by the author of this paper who now 
serves as the project’s academic advisor, and is supported by the European Commission 
through its Leonardo da Vinci vocational training program5. NISSOS is developing a 
training module and a learning pack intended for students in post-secondary vocational 
                                          
4 Nissos is the Greek word for island and is also an acronym for: Network of Islands for Small Scale 
Organizational Success. For more about the NISSOS project visit: http://www.nissos.net   
5 http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/programmes/leonardo/leonardo_en.html (Accessed: 7th April 
2005). 
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education and training (VET) which is sensitive to, and based on, the ‘best practices’ 
and experiences of those few but successful, small scale, locally owned, export-driven, 
technology adaptive, manufacturing units in small island territories. The 11 partners are 
co-ordinating inter-disciplinary research into those exceptionally successful firms 
which match these criteria of success from 5 island territories in Europe: the Åland 
Islands (Finland), Iceland, Malta, Saaremaa (Estonia) & the Scottish Isles (United 
Kingdom)6.  
 
Deciding on the meaning of success was not easy and remains essentially 
subjective. Some standard criteria – like years of establishment, levels of annual 
turnover or of employment – were not chosen. Eventually, success was defined by the 
project partners in terms of five variables which were felt to best capture a sense of 
local entrepreneurship and a local maximization of the value added derived from any 
production process. Adopting these five variables also meant that the number of firms 
from the participating islands to be examined as success stories would be few and 
therefore no sampling would be necessary.  Only those firms which fulfilled all five 
variables in the participating island regions were adopted. The variables are:  
(1) local ownership, meaning majority or exclusive control of the firm 
is vested in individuals who are resident islanders;  
(2) small size, meaning firm has up to 50 employees or outworkers;  
(3) manufacturing, meaning firm is producing a commodity that 
usually has weight, volume or form, which can be separated from its producer 
in the act of sale or purchase;  
                                          
6 Of course, the exact number of such firms is difficult to propose, and will change with time. We are 
referring to firms that operate in dynamic markets. Data in Tables 1 & 2 is correct as at summer 2004. 
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(4) export orientation, meaning the bulk of the firm’s manufactures are 
destined to off-island markets and clients and have been so for at least three 
previous consecutive years; and  
(5) technology adaptation, meaning that any key technological 
processes used by the firm in the manufacturing operation have been 
customized, if not invented, by the local operators. 
 
Methodology 
The partners first identified 144 firms which corresponded to the success 
criteria. This was no easy task, since official statistics do not identify firms in 
accordance with such descriptors; while data on firms by island had to be painstakingly 
compiled by the project partners in the case of a ‘non-jurisdiction’ like the Scottish 
Isles. Dealing with discrete small numbers, and personal contacts with economic 
specialists, state or regional officials and business associations facilitated this process.  
Åland turns out to have a relatively large number of such successful firms on a per 
capita basis, and Malta the lowest; suggesting that smaller island populations may be 
more inclined, or obliged, to spawn and support such firms (Baldacchino, 2005a) (see 
Table 1): 
 
Table 1: Island Regions and Successful Firms involved in NISSOS Project 
Island  
Territory 
Population Land Area 
 (sq. km) 
No. of populated 
Islands 
Jurisdiction No of 
Firms* 




Åland  26,000     1,430 21 autonomy within Finland 25 9.6 15.9 
Iceland 290,000 103,000  4 sovereign state 42 1.5 26 
Malta 400,000       315  3 sovereign state 33 0.8 22.5 
Saaremaa  36,000    2,900  7 county 19 5.3 23.3 
Scottish Isles 100,000  10,110 87 spread over 6 local authorities 25 2.5 10.5 
 
* These being locally [island] owned, mainly export-oriented, manufacturing firms with up 
to 50 employees and with locally developed or adapted technology. 
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The five sets of islands support a broad range of manufacturing activity, which 
can be organized in terms of four economic sub-sectors (see Table 2). The majority of 
successful firms (82 out of 144: 57%) have developed a manufactured product whose 
core raw material imput is mainly or totally sourced from the island proper: this reduces 
import bills and the accompanying transportation and insurance premiums. Most 
products also have a clear, often strong, identification with the history and culture of the 
island on which they are produced. Such branding facilitates a selective, niche marketing 
of the product and permits a synergetic association with the tourism industry – important 
in all five island territories being investigated. Tourist clients also help to forego any 
export costs of the manufactures by absorbing them themselves (Baldacchino, 2005b).  
 
Table 2: Economic Sub-Sectors of 144 Successful Firms from 5 Island Regions (Total 






Natural Natural Chemical IT / Hi-Tech 
  Craft Agro Plastic Engineering 
Åland  wood panels processed meat sausage skins purifier units 
  Furniture fish processing air cleaning systems IT / software 
  sheet-metal (9) sour apples (7) plastic printing (5) welding 
 25  electrical systems (4) 
Iceland   cod/shark liver oil sulphur resistant pipes Artificial-Intelligence 
Games 
   cattle food plastic tubs Virus Software 
   candy fishing nets electrical equipment 
   poultry processing fibre-glass boats fish industry equipment 
 42  fish processing (20) fish scales (9) digital EEGs (13) 
Malta  decorative glass olive oil plastic pipes / cables IT packages 
  gold/silver filigree wine / sausages paints / detergents Software support 
  Furniture (6) sun-dried tomatoes printing / packaging solar panels (6) 
 33  liqueurs (6) injection moulding (15)  
Saaremaa  wooden boats fish processing rubber products (2) aluminum boats (2) 
  wooden houses berry processing  
  lime / agar (8) meat processing  
 19  fur products (7)  
Scottish Isles  Stone preserves toiletries / soaps (2) electrical instruments 
  woolen knitwear / 
fabrics 
beer flexible circuits 
  Jewelry whisky observation devices 
  pottery / drums smoked salmon (7) transformers (4) 
 25 Furniture (12)  
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The second research phase consisted in targetting two successful firms from 
each island region operating in different economic sub-sectors. One would be based on 
a manufacture developed around locally available raw material inputs (the natural craft 
or natural agriculture sub-sectors identified in Table 2 above); the second would be a 
technology driven firm (IT/ high-tech/ engineering sub-sector in Table 2 above). 
Detailed enterprise data for this purpose was collated from a semi-structured 65-
question template questionnaire developed by the NISSOS partners during Spring 
2003, and following a review of the literature. It includes: quantitative, descriptive data 
about the firm; an account of the stakeholders’ position with respect to the firm; the 
enterprise’s specific competences (production considerations, marketing orientation, 
operational effectiveness); the enterprise’s ‘internal’ architecture and technology 
dependence; its human resource policies; firm reputation and product branding; the 
firm’s institutional relationships (with banks, state departments, development 
corporations) and its ‘goodness of fit’ with its environment. (The questionnaire 
template is attached as an appendix.) 
 
Being semi-structured, the survey template often served as a basis for an 
extended conversation conducted in the local language.  It was was first pilot-tested on 
the five small successful (as defined) craft-based firms in summer 2003 (for a 
discussion on findings, see Baldacchino, 2005c). Later in 2003, the slightly revised 
template was administered by the island-based project partners to five other small 
exceptional firms, operating this time in the high-tech sector. Three of these (Consilia, 
Frisk & Shireburn) operate in the burgeoning market for internet-related services; one 
(Baltic Workboats) produces customised small aluminium sea-craft; the other (Gaeltec) 
produces electronic instruments used in the medical field. Data was mainly derived by 
site visits to the firms, interviews with the founder or chief executive officer, and 
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corroborated by means of informal discussions with employees. The site visits were 
undertaken by the same officials involved in the NISSOS partner meetings, and with 
the assistance of students of business studies in the case of Åland, Estonia and Iceland. 
Follow-ups and phone calls have been held with the firms in order to secure missing 
information, or to clarify previously gathered data. All 10 firms selected to participate 
consented to support the research. Given the small island society context, the 
entrepreneurs, some of the employees and interviewers were known (at times, very well 
known) to each other prior to the research exercise.  
 
A summary of the collated data pertaining to the five, knowledge-driven firms 
which form the key focus of this article is available as Table 3: 
 
Table 3 here 
Discussion 
 
One swallow does not make a summer; and it would be foolish to propose 
anything but tentative observations from an analysis of five firms, one from each island 
region.  These observations are organized under ten distinct, though inter-related 
sections, each highlighting one characteristic which may prove critical towards a more 
informed understanding of the underlying causes behind small business success in 
small islands. 
 
a) – Two Routes towards Firm Establishment 
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With one exception, the firms owe their existence to the ideas, energy and 
financing provided by the founder-owner, possibly along with an immediate family 
member or a close friend with complimentary skills. The respective entrepreneurs and 
innovators set in motion an operation that did not require a huge outlay of capital, and 
therefore did not oblige a resort to outside financing that could have compromised the 
ownership of the operation. Baltic Workboats, in contrast, had to rely on a combination 
of proven management skills and external financing to be able to get going. This case 
represents a different, non-traditional route to the emergence of small firms: the chief 
executive, the plant, some of the employees and the business contacts were sourced 
from other, hitherto state-run operations which had folded up in previous years. Such 
conversions lie behind the setting up of various small firms in Eastern and Central 
European countries, following the aftermath of the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the 
Soviet Union wth its centrally planned economy. 
 
 b) – Existing Firms acting as Incubators 
 
In all five cases, spawning the idea for the eventual business product and the 
idea of setting up a new business for its development emerged intrapreneurially, while 
the eventual founder/owner was still in the employ of some other company (Hellmann, 
2002). This feature sheds light on how the origins of entrepreneurship and product 
innovation are not necessarily associated with self-employment. Existing firms become, 
often willy-nilly, incubators of other firms, some of which may end up becoming their 
competitors. Business development then becomes in part a strategy of weaning away 
from one’s employment status, carefully negotiating the manner in which one’s former 
employer and the associated resources may be put to good use in one’s eventual own 
business. The intellectual ownership of the product idea is a crucial component of such 
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negotiations; but technical support, marketing support and venture capital may also be 
vital issues to be considered. 
 
 c) – Competitive Manufactures 
 
Being small and based on a peripheral island may not confer advantages; yet, 
nor does it appear to be a disadvantage in exploiting the opportunities presented by the 
growth of modern information and communication technologies (ICTs). The internet 
has witnessed and spawned a completely new range of services and software. The latter 
are, in a sense, manufactures since they are tangible and can be bought and sold via 
operations that are distinct from those involving their actual production. Still their 
virtual nature, their weightlessness and portability remove any disadvantages that small 
firms on small islands might have to bear in relation to transportation costs. Consilia, 
Frisk and Shireburn have successfully located themselves in the global ICT market. 
Furthermore, Frisk enjoys the advantage of having not just adapted but created its main 
product: anti-virus software. It was a leader in this sector and has managed to maintain 
itself in this market. Shireburn has plugged into the captured market of Lotus Notes® 
users. Meanwhile, although Gaeltec’s main product (electronic transducers) is a 
conventional one in terms of occupying physical space and having physical weight, its 
miniature and lightweight nature makes it exportable via conventional mail: a huge 
saving on transport expenses. 
 
 d) – Driving Overseas Client Support 
 
The one main disadvantage of being an ICT-service provider located on an 
island may relate to after-sales customer support. The costs of travel, accommodation 
 13 
and human resources which may have to go into servicing software used by one’s 
clients (who would be mainly located overseas) can be very large relative to the ICT 
product’s cost. Frisk and Shireburn have solved this issue to their satisfaction: Frisk’s 
very particular software does not require any servicing; while Shireburn uses digital 
subscriber line (DSL) technology to assist its foreign clients: since 2001, it has only 
made two overseas sales calls in person. Meanwhile, given its particular services, 
Consilia may find that clients located ‘away’ are more difficult to satisfy. 
 
 e) – Securing Overseas Clients 
 
Indeed, managing to identify and maintain clients abroad is always a challenge 
to SMEs, and all the more so to firms which are located in relatively remote locations. 
This condition may oblige specific tactical measures. Consilia’s boss lived and worked 
in Stockholm, Sweden, for many years. That is where he sourced his business contacts 
which he eventually brought back along with him when he returned to the Åland 
Islands. The loss of such clients in 2003 reveals the dangers of too excessive a 
dependence on a few contacts; the latter may need to be replenished via regular visits to 
the metropole. Shireburn’s founder spent a decade studying in the United Kingdom and 
spun off his business venture with the assistance of a brother who worked in an 
accountancy firm in the City of London and provided contacts to potential clients. 
London was also the occupational base of the founder of Gaeltec, and the location 
which allowed him to develop the required expertise. In the case of Baltic Workboats, 
the firm enjoys the expertise of a Finnish marine engineer who has moved to Saaremaa. 
It is only Frisk which can depend exclusively on the internet for its marketing 
requirements; and this is a function of the very particular nature of its products. 
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f) -  Manoeuvring as Glocal Citizens 
 
Working in cosmopolitan centres, and with multinational firms, helps one to get 
a feel of global markets and to nurture and plug into useful contacts and cutting-edge 
technologies that can prove crucial for business survival. However, the lure of the 
island is strong. Central to the ‘quality of island life’ is its rich ‘social capital’, defined 
as “networks, together with shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate co-
operation within and among groups” (Helliwell, 2003: 9). This is in sharp contrast to 
the frenetic, stress-laden and competitive environment of the city and can be strong 
enough to draw would-be entrepreneurs back to their island, and to encourage others to 
immigrate. It is the ability to become “glocal” (after Courchene, 1995) - combining the 
desirability of the island milieu with the necessity to be globally competitive  - that is a 
major, but not impossible, challenge. Both island roots and off-island routes need to be 
privileged (Clifford, 1997). This detail cannot be stressed enough: interviewed island-
based enterpreneurs were convinced that they were likely to enjoy larger turnovers if 
their businesses had been located in metropolitan areas: but they remain determined to 
keep their firm located ‘on the island’ because of the ‘quality of life’ factor. 
 
 g) – Island Branding… but not too Close 
 
Branding and customer loyalty are also important considerations; only Baltic 
Workboats is still in the process of branding their product, and it intends doing soon, 
using an English name. In all such cases, however, and in contrast to other firms 
operating in lower-technology manufacturing (such as craft or agro-industry), there is 
no attempt to brand the product closely to its island provenance. The entrepreneurs fear 
that such an association may reduce the perceived quality of the product they are 
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offering in the eyes of their foreign clients; although a whiff of exoticism may 
contribute to make their product somewhat more attractive. Frisk provides the software 
to the Icelandic national geneaeology database and web-site7 (with access limited to 
Icelandic nationals), but this has no direct relationship with its anti-virus export product 
and is mainly a form of sponsorship-in-kind to the Icelandic community. 
 
 h) – Targetted External Supports 
 
Institutional support to the ventures under consideration varies. It appears that, 
in spite of all the attempts at coming up with effective state support to SMEs, especially 
in their drive to source export markets, from around Europe, many entrepreneurs 
remain quite sceptical of any such function. Institutional support is nil or marginal in 
three of our five cases; if not negative because of an obligation towards overwhelming 
paperwork. In the Iceland case, the firm alleges that the local state actually prefers to 
source foreign supplies of the same product rather than go for the local version: perhaps 
an example of the prophet not being respected in one’s own land, and even more 
glaring when one hails from a small island where everyone knows, or can get to know, 
everyone else? This low penetration rate of state assistance programes to SMEs is also 
borne out by the literature (e.g.: Curran & Blackburn, 2000, in relation to the United 
Kingdom). The Malta case identifies state support via export incentive schemes, lower 
corporate tax and training support: Shireburn Software was hived off the mother 
company also for the purpose of tapping such grants. In Iceland, institutional support is 
focussed mainly on firms operating in rural areas; since the bulk of IT-firms are located 
in and around Reykjavik, they are therefore excluded. Gaeltec stands out for reporting 
                                          
7 http://www.islendingabok.is/IServlets/index.jsp - and, as extra security, only available in Icelandic. 
(Accessed: 9th April 2005). 
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the most comprehensive institutional support package. Highlands & Islands Enterprise, 
as its predecessors, has supported Gaeltec’s construction costs, trips abroad and a 
variety of other promotional measures. 
 
i) – Seeking & Securing International Standards 
 
The concern with product quality is met mainly via the satisfaction of external 
clients. After all, practically all the competition being faced by these ‘high-tech’ firms 
is coming from off island already. Only one of the five firms under study can source 
any of its required technological imputs locally. It is next to impossible to conceive of a 
cluster of locally based, supportive firms as could occur in other, larger locations (e.g.: 
Chen, 1999). International awards and recognition by the UK-based Financial Times 
(in the case of Shireburn) are important signifies of a successful and reliable product 
and associated, crucial ‘after sales’ customer service (see King, 2004). A Russian and a 
European ship register have both certified Baltic Workboats’ craft as meeting 
international standards. 
 
 j) –  A Professional but Loyal Workforce 
 
The human resources required to develop and maintain such up-market 
products cannot be short of professional. All five firms explain that their employees, 
while all trained in-house, have been sourced from suitable post-secondary institutions 
and include a number of graduates. Many have been trained or sent on work 
experiences off island. Many are bilingual or trilingual, with English recognised as a 
key international language. Baltic Workboats’ employees have benefitted from 
apprenticeships with a Finnish company which had placed orders for the Estonian 
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firm’s seacraft. Above average salaries and lean hierarchies keep staff turnover at 
extremely low levels, reward staff investment in higher education and recognize the 





The life-histories of islanders, in those rare instances where they are 
meticulously documented, reveal a complex juggling of the pros and cons of home and 
away. Thus, both Isaac Caines, from the Caribbean island of St Kitts (profiled in 
Richardson, 1983: 54-5) and Kawagl, from the Melanesian South Pacific (profiled in 
Brookfield, 1972: 167-8), are rare examples of ‘entrepreneurs as people’ (Mitchell et 
al., 2002). Both personalities demonstrate an uncanny skill in the economies and 
temporalities of scope, which include entrepreneurship, flexible specialisation and 
stints abroad.  
 
Thus, unlike much received wisdom about island life, the notion of an isolated, 
inward-looking and self-engrossed entity does not necessarily capture the way in which 
islands are experienced and practised by islanders and those who identify with islands 
(Manners, 1965: 181; Fog Olwig, 2004). More realistically, an island, and a small 
island especially, is a place that is oriented towards the outside world to which it relates 
as its hinterland (Baldacchino, 2005c). Island societies are involved in both sheltering 
and generating themselves from processes of globalization in which contextually given 
boundaries are transgressed and displaced (Singh & Grünbühel, 2003: 191). Rather 
than obstacles conducive to defeatism, the smallness of the local market and the 
existence of an all-surrounding sea provide clear and added impulses towards an export 
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orientation from small island entrepreneurs that seek to thrive on the basis of high 
product quality, proposing not so much to exploit comparative or competitive 
advantage but to construct an advantage based on products that are either intangible or 
relatively light and therefore still price-competitive from island locations (Cooke & 
Leydesdorff, 2006, forthcoming). In so doing, the small island must strategically 
connect with the global economy, identifying and cultivating markets, networks and 
clients, somehow following and keeping a tab on innovationary trends, often doing so 
by maintaining a vibrant traffic of people and ideas with the rest of the world. “The 
influence of outsider-generated knowledge resources” (Chrisman, 1999) is crucial in 
this instance. However, it needs to progress beyond its conventional interpretation as 
meaning external consultants or skilled expertise in short local supply: in small islands, 
these knowledge resources may include the very entrepreneur. Luring back the islander 
who had gone away or attracting an immigrant innovator is key to adequate glocality. 
 
It is hoped that the inductive fieldwork based on comparative island research 
which has produced this paper becomes a more common undertaking amongst 
researchers, educators and practitioners interested in promoting island enterprise. It 
should also mitigate the excessive pessimism that often ‘defines away’ the development 
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Table 3: Summative Data for 5 Successful ‘High-Tech’ Firms gleaned from Questionnaire 
  Aland Iceland Malta Saaremaa Scotland 
Firm Consilia Solutions Frisk Software Shireburn Software Baltic Workboats Gaeltec 
Product -Q1 
Web-Content Mng’t 
System Anti-Virus Software 






Year Established 1997 1993 1993 2000 1971 
Employees -Q2 5 45 
5 (out of 20 in mother 
firm) 29 22 
Exports as % 
Turnover-Q4 60%(2002) 90% (2003) 95% (2003) 90% (2003) 53% (2001) 
Idea Originator 
Founder (runs other 




Turnover:euros-Q3 300,000 500,000 82,000 1,800,000 900,000 
Local competitors-Q6 1 (various int’l) 1 (20 intern’l). nil (3 intern’l) 1 (3 in Finland) nil (2 int’l) 
Why set up-Q12 business opportunity business opportunity
higher value / 
diversity 
take over idle 
plant business opportunity
Why export-Q16 
continue what was  
started in Sweden small home market 
away from ‘hours for 
$’ 
initially 
subcontracted chance encounter 
  english version first       
Founder(s) Jan-Olof Engblom Fridrik Skulason John De Giorgio 
Mark Muru + 
Investors Donald MacLachlan






family business / IT 
trainer 
Head, Former 













related) not related Syd Johnson (+4) 
            
Training-Q43 in-house in-house in-house/ abroad in-house/abroad in-house 
Worker Turnover-Q45 low low (5%) low low (7%) low 
Skill availability-






prior firm yes 
Salaries & Wages-
Q48 
above average + 
perks average above average above avarage average 
Best Practice (HR)-




completion team spirit 
            
Rely on Internet-Q11 no yes - main selling tool
yes-downloadable 
software no web site 
less than 10% of 
sales 
Cheaper than 
Competition? yes no no   no 
Cost Advantage-Q28 
lower fixed costs / 
rents no lower cost base 
yes (20% 
cheaper). no 
Technology-Q20/21 adapted/invented invented adapted/invented 
adapted/improve
d adapted/patented 
Local Suppliers of 
Tech’y? no no no yes no 
Best Practice 
(Prod’n) -Q32 nil portability Int’l awards/reviews 
Ship Registry 
approval flexibility 
           




Q59 own savings / bank private savings mother firm Investors   
Institutional Support nil nil (industry bias) Brother in UK 
Marine Alutech 
(Finland) 
H+IEB (now H+I 
Enterprise) 
 28 
State support-Q60/61 trade fair participation too much paperwork
export incentive/ 
lower tax/ no 
building costs/trips 
abroad 
    
state opts for foreign 
brands training support   too much paperwork
Obstacles to Export-
65 no time for marketing nil 
meeting people in 
person     
Networking?-Q64 crucial - but needs download.com 
via ‘captured’ Lotus 
clients good contacts to identify first clients
 re-nourishment         
Link with Island-Q49 tired of hectic tempo 
link with geneaeology 
site less credibility no pressure of work 
Other Island Effects & city commuting exotic low cost base no rat-race in London 
  proximity to nature   exotic no   
Product Branding? yes yes yes not yet   
Island Branding? no no no no   




w’force Former Finn=   
  
boss spent time + 
own brand loyalty good base for sailing!
engineering 
designer lightweight product 
  company in Sweden 
new product at right 
time brand loyalty 
lured to 
Saaremaa uses conventional mail 
  no freight costs no freight costs 
UK work permit 
refused transport costs  








The revised, proposed fieldwork template is outlined below. It consists of 65 











 Production Considerations 
Marketing Orientation 
Operational Effectiveness 















1. Product Description:  
2. Number of Employees (full-time & other): 
3. Turnover in € (Annual data over the 5-year-period: 1997-2002): 
4. Exports as a percentage of turnover (same 5 year-period): 
5. Number of years exporting: 
6. Number of ‘direct’ local competitors: 
7. Number & Names of countries presently exporting to: 
8. Number of ‘regular’ overseas clients: 
9. Position & name of person responsible within enterprise for exports: 
10. Freight costs as a percentage of landed (c.i.f.) price in main export market: 




12. How did the project idea originate? 
A. Enterprise Data 
B. Stakeholder Analysis 
C. Enterprise Competencies 
D. The Enterprise’s Resources 
E. Enterprise ‘fit’ with its Environment 
F. Other Reasons 
Deleted: 2
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13. How was the initial finance for the project raised? 
14. Did the firm find the necessary institutional support? 
15. What are the perceived reasons for the firm’s success in exporting? 
  
 internal  
the owner/managing director  
other management 
employees 







    other 
 
16. Who and what triggered the drive to export? 
 Saturation of home market 
 Retaliation to entry of foreign competitors in home market 
 Diversification of business (e.g. currency) risks 





i. Production Considerations 
17. Are the firm’s products priced cheaper on the export market? 
18. Does the product have any unique features or specialised use? 
19. If the firm has a cost advantage is it due to: 
    Cheaper Costs: raw materials; labour; water; electricity; other 
 Uniqueness of production process 
 Flexibility  - small runs 
 Location- closeness to market 
 Other 
 
20. Is the production technology imported? 
21. Has the firm improved this technology? 
22. Are there any local suppliers of specialised machinery used in the production 
process? 
 
ii. Marketing Orientation 
23. How were the first contacts with the export market established? 
24. Where export opportunities to other markets explored? 
25. Is the exported product any different from that sold in the home market? 
26. Who are the firm’s main competitors in the respective export markets? 
27. Are any of these competitors from the same country as the firm? 
28. Are the products of competitors cheaper or more expensive? (Possibly indicate 
difference as a percentage of firm’s price.) 
29. How does the firm’s exported product reach the final buyer? 
30. Does firm enjoy competitive advantage from its distribution system abroad? 
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31. How are sales in the export market promoted and supported? (via advertising, 
below-the-line promotions, discounts, etc.) 
 
iii. Operational Effectiveness 
32. Does the firm follow any ‘best’ practice that gives it a cost or an operational 
advantage, such as: 
 Financial Management 





iv. Enterprise ‘Internal’ Architecture 
33. Does firm follow any ‘best’ practice in: structure, internal communication, 
drive to support worker commitment that lead to a competitive advantage, 
including: 
 Stimulating team spirit 
 Transmits enterprise values 
 Communicates objectives  
 Sets and monitors targets 
 Rewards performance 
 




34. Was the enterprise established by its present owner? 
35. What was the background of the original owner? 
36. Is the enterprise still managed by its owner? 
37. Are there other managers running the enterprise? 
38. Are they related to the owner? (yes/no/both): 
39. If they are relatives of the owner, have they had a formal training in the activity 
they are responsible for? 
40. Does the company’s production require any specially-skilled workers? 
41. If yes, are these skills readily available on the labour market? 
42. If yes, where is the supply of such skilled workers coming from? 
43. If no, does the enterprise provide its own training? 
44. Who is responsible for training such workers in-house? 
45.  What % of your staff has been replaced over the past twelve months? 
46. What % of your staff has had training and/or work experience off the island? 
47. What % of your staff has had educational experience off the island (do 
NOT include distance learning)? 





49. Does the enterprise benefit from the reputation of its region/island/country in 
its line of business? 
50. If yes, can this benefit be defined? 
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51. Does the enterprise enjoy a reputation among its clients as a quality supplier of 
products/services? 
52.  Is such reputation shared by other stakeholders such as, suppliers, banks, local 
authorities? 
53. Does the enterprise brand its products? 
54. Is this brand different from the enterprise’s name? 
55. What percentage of the client base would select a product on the reputation of 
the enterprise rather than the strength of its brand? 
56. How does the enterprise actively promote its brand? 




Enterprise ‘fit’ with its Environment 
 
58. Define the enterprise’s relationship with the bank: 
59. Define the enterprise’s sources of finance: 
60. Has the enterprise benefited from state support programmes for small 
enterprises? (heavily/significantly/marginally). Specify: 
61. Where state programmes or agencies supportive of the export drive? 
(heavily/significantly/marginally). Specify: 
62. Did Government offer specific incentives to encourage exports? Specify: 
63. Does the enterprise have any strategic alliance with supplier/key client? 
64. Does the enterprise in any way network with similar enterprises in its field? 
65. What where the main limiting factors/obstacles that the enterprise had to 
overcome in its drive to export? 
 
 
Other Reasons for ‘success’? 
 
 
Be sure to identify, in as much detail as necessary, the following 3 
features:  
 
-  The evolution of entrepreneurship: WHY and HOW was the firm actually started? 
What led to the entrepreneur to take up the challenge of production? 
 
– The adaptation of technology: WHY and HOW did the production process and design 
get adapted (and not just adopted)? 
 
– The leap into export: WHY and HOW did the firm take the critical step of trying to 
go for [off-island] exports? 
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